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by
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Abstract: This paper empirically compares civil procedure in
common law and civil law countries. Using World-Bank and
hand-collected data, and unlike earlier studies that used predeces-
sor data sets, this paper ￿nds no systematic di⁄erences between
common and civil law countries in the complexity, formalism, du-
ration, or cost of procedure in courts of ￿rst instance. The paper
further ￿nds that by a subjective measure, contract enforceability
in common law countries is higher than in French, but lower than
in German and Scandinavian, civil law countries. Given civil pro-
cedure￿ s central role for the common/civil law distinction, these
￿ndings challenge the distinction￿ s economic relevance. (JEL:
K40, K41, P51)
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1 Introduction
The divergence of common and civil law began with reforms of judicial or-
ganization and procedure in England during the reign of Henry II (Dawson
[1968]; Caenegem [1988]). Today, even scholars who otherwise see few rele-
vant di⁄erences between contemporary common and civil law agree that there
are still important di⁄erences in the area of judicial adjudication and enforce-
ment of private claims (civil procedure). In particular, common law juris-
dictions tend to concentrate the trial, to involve the parties in the collection
of evidence, and to curb appeals, more than civil law countries (Goldstein
[1995]; Zweigert and K￿tz [1998]). Do these structural di⁄erences lead
to measurable di⁄erences in performance, and/or can they be captured by
simple measures of complexity and formalism?
Two seminal empirical studies have answered these questions in the af-
￿rmative. The World Bank￿ s ￿rst Doing Business report and one of its
background studies constructed and collected measures of the complexity,
formalism, duration, and cost of civil procedure in courts of ￿rst instance in
133 and 109 countries, respectively, in or around the year 2003. They found
that civil law countries had on average more complex and formalist proce-
dures, and that more complex and formalist procedures were in turn longer
and costlier, with no o⁄setting bene￿ts in terms of securing better justice
(World Bank [2004]; Djankov et al. [2003]).
This paper revisits these questions with improved and expanded data,
and ￿nds no systematic di⁄erences between common and civil law countries.
Most of the paper￿ s conclusions are based on corrections of the earlier data
by the World Bank itself. Its latest Doing Business report presents cor-
rected and expanded data on complexity, duration, and cost for now up to
181 countries in the years 2003-2008 (World Bank [2009a]). As section
2 shows, these new data con￿rm that complexity may induce delay and ex-
pense without furthering justice in other ways, but they do not reveal any
di⁄erences between common and civil law countries on any of these three
measures. In other words, the original ￿ndings that civil procedure in civil
law countries was more complex, protracted, and costly than in common law
countries seem to have been artefacts of measurement error in the original
data. It is likely that the formalism measure, which was discontinued by
the World Bank after the ￿rst Doing Business report, su⁄ered from similar
systematic measurement error, and section 3 presents some initial evidence
from four key jurisdictions suggesting that this was indeed the case, and that
2civil procedure is not more formalist in civil law countries than in common
law countries either.
The World Bank data are conceptually limited. First, they are based
on a particular reference scenario, and hence do not account for the whole
spectrum of civil litigation handled by the courts. Second, the data are
explicitly limited to courts of ￿rst instance, yet appeals can be a major factor
particularly for duration, and as mentioned above are thought to be more
frequent in civil law countries. Third, the data do not measure the quality of
the ultimate judicial decision. It is therefore possible that the quality of civil
procedure di⁄ers between common and civil law countries along dimensions
not covered by the World Bank data. To address this possibility in as far as
the available data allow, section 4 compares the enforceability of contracts
in common and civil law countries using subjective analyst data. These data
suggest that common law countries are performing better than French civil
law countries, but worse than German and Scandinavian civil law countries.
Section 5 concludes by drawing out the implications of these ￿ndings for
interpreting correlations between legal families and economic outcomes in
other domains. Many such correlations have been documented in the "legal
origins" literature, to which World Bank [2004] and Djankov et al.
[2003] belong.
Other papers revisiting early results of the legal origins literature with
newer, more reliable data are Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer [2007]
on creditor rights, and Spamann [2009a] on shareholder rights. The origi-
nal civil procedure data, however, have not yet been reconsidered, and have
been frequently used in the economic literature (e.g., Acemoglu and John-
son [2005]; Balas et al. [2009]). Hayo and Voigt [2008] challenge
the formalism index from a conceptual point of view and, using the origi-
nal data, argue empirically that some formalist elements are bene￿cial for
economic growth. Kern [2007] criticizes the crudeness of the original stud-
ies in comparison to the more nuanced yet purely qualitative comparative
legal literature. Djankov et al. [2008] provide evidence of di⁄erences
between common and civil law countries in a specialized area of procedure,
bankruptcy.
Throughout, this paper uses the legal origin classi￿cation of La Porta
et al. [2008], which updates previously used data by reassigning former
socialist countries from socialist legal origin to French or German civil law.1
1The sample of La Porta et al. [2008] did not include Brunei, Kiribati, the Marshall
3The paper reports results using the natural logarithm of the variables from
World Bank [2009a]; unreported results with levels are similar.
2 Complexity, duration, and cost
This section introduces and analyzes the most recent World Bank data on
complexity, duration, and cost. Subsection 1 describes the data and how
they di⁄er from earlier editions, which they explicitly supersede. Subsection
2 brie￿ y comments on the interpretation of the complexity measure. Subsec-
tion 3 shows that neither complexity, duration, nor cost di⁄er systematically
by legal origin.
2.1 Description of the data and of di⁄erences to earlier editions
The "enforcement of contracts" section of the World Bank￿ s most recent
Doing Business report [2009a] provides time series of procedural complexity,
duration, and cost in courts of ￿rst instance for up to 181 countries in the
years 2003-2008 (starting with 133 countries in 2003). The data refer to a
standardized litigation scenario from ￿ling of suit to execution of judgment:
Brie￿ y, plainti⁄sues in the country￿ s most populous city for payment of sold
goods worth 200% of the country￿ s GDP per capita; the defendant refuses
payment on the grounds of inadequate quality; the judge decides fully in
plainti⁄￿ s favor; there is no appeal. Based on this scenario, legal practitioners
in each country annually answer tick-the-box questions for a long list of
possible procedural steps, and provide estimates of the out-of-pocket cost
and duration of various stages of the procedure (World Bank [2008a]). In
addition, the World Bank provides a public discussion forum for challenges
to the data on its website. A World Bank team working exclusively on
"enforcement of contracts" coordinates and veri￿es the responses through
multiple interactions with the respondents, and distills the responses into
three variables: total duration in days, total cost as a percentage of the
claim value (i.e., indirectly as a percentage of GDP per capita), and the
total number of required or usual procedural steps, which is referred to as
complexity in this paper (cf. subsection 2.2 below).
Islands, and Timor-Leste, nor Serbia and Montenegro. For this paper, the ￿rst four
countries instead took their legal origin classi￿cation from La Porta et al. [1999].
Serbia and Montenegro inherited their (French) legal origin from the former Yugoslavia.
Palau, and West Bank and Gaza, are not classi￿ed.
4The current data not only extend but correct and explicitly supersede
the data of earlier Doing Business reports (World Bank [2008b], [2008c],
[2009b]). Over the years, the World Bank weeded out measurement errors,2
and made small changes to the methodology to improve the variables￿va-
lidity.3 In particular, it adapted the questionnaire to accommodate di⁄erent
ways of organizing the procedure, whose intricacies (Goldstein [1995]) were
presumably underappreciated in the pioneering report. Between the 2008 and
2009 reports alone, 6% of the data were corrected (World Bank [2009b]).
The aggregate impact of the improvements since the original 2004 report can
be gauged by the low rank correlations between the original Doing Business
data and data for the same year (2003) from the most recent edition (World
Bank [2009a]) shown in table 1: .33 for complexity, .53 for duration, and
.54 for cost.
Besides corrections properly speaking, the World Bank also made some
slight modi￿cations to the reference scenario that went beyond technical im-
provements. In particular, the current scenario postulates a claim for the
price of delivered merchandise in the amount of 200% of GDP per capita,
while the original scenario postulated a generic contractual claim in the
amount of 50% of GDP per capita (World Bank [2004], p. 109). These
modi￿cations seem too minor, however, to account for more than a very small
part of the di⁄erence between the current and the original Doing Business
data. This is particularly clear in comparison with the data collected in the
background study to the ￿rst report, which refer to the eviction of a residen-
tial tenant and to the collection on a bounced check (in the amount of 5%
of GNI per capita) (Djankov et al. [2003]). As table 1 shows, the rank
correlations between corresponding variables from Djankov et al. [2003]
and World Bank [2004] are much higher than those between correspond-
ing variables from World Bank [2004] and World Bank [2009a], even
though the procedures underlying the former two data sets are much less
similar to one another than those underlying the latter two. This pattern is
2For example, according to the original report (World Bank [2004]), only seven days
were supposed to pass between the ￿ling of the suit and enforcement of the judgment in
Tunisia (p. 42), and the entire procedure was supposed to cost only US$ 120 in the USA
(p. 46). By comparison, the corresponding, more realistic numbers in the current data set
are 565 days and US$ 1,868, respectively (World Bank [2009a]).
3"To provide a comparable time series for research, the data set is back-calculated to
adjust for changes in methodology and any revisions in data due to corrections" (World
Bank [2009b]).
5consistent with the idea that the ￿rst generation data contained correlated
imperfections that were removed in subsequent revisions of the data; it is in-
consistent with the idea that the ￿rst generation data were similarly reliable
as the current data but di⁄er because they refer to a (very slightly) di⁄erent
scenario.
2.2 Interpretation and e⁄ects of complexity
While the meaning of the duration and cost measures is straightforward, the
meaning of the complexity measure is not. The measure con￿ ates and equally
weights disparate steps like the assignment of the case to a judge, mandatory
mediation, the oral hearing or trial, and the court￿ s noti￿cation of the par-
ties that the written judgment is available in the courthouse (World Bank
[2008a]). These di⁄er vastly in importance and length. Moreover, the sim-
ple summation of the steps gives equal weight to bene￿cial and detrimental
requirements. Consequently, the measure would not distinguish between the
optimal combination of steps and an even vastly inferior alternative as long
as the overall number of steps is the same. Viewed in a practical perspective,
policy makers who desire to reduce the complexity of civil procedure would
not know which of the many steps of the procedure to eliminate ￿some of
those steps, like the oral hearing, are presumably essential. If this is the
case, what if anything can one learn from comparing the complexity scores
of common and civil law countries?
It is likely, however, that all countries retain the essential steps of the
procedure, and hence that variation in the complexity score results from
additional steps of uncertain utility. If this were the case, regression results
with the complexity score would re￿ ect the value of these in-essential steps
in the abstract, without pinning down precisely which steps matter. By
contrast, if the complexity measure were noise, we would not expect to see
any signi￿cant regression results.
Table 2 shows some support for the ￿rst view. The table shows estimates
from levels (panel A) and ￿rst-di⁄erence (panel B) regressions of procedural
quality (duration, cost, and the enforceability variable discussed in section 4.1
below) on complexity as the principal independent variable. These estimates
suggest that at prevailing levels, procedural complexity as proxied by the
number of steps is associated with substantially higher duration and perhaps
higher cost, and lower perceived quality of contract enforcement in general.
Assuming that the complexity variable is a valid measure of a relevant con-
6cept, the ￿rst-di⁄erence estimates can even be interpreted as evidence of
a causal e⁄ect under some strong yet plausible assumptions (in particular,
that rule changes have immediate e⁄ects, and do not anticipate shocks to the
litigation system). As Jonathan Klick points out in his excellent comment,
these estimates are fragile and need to be interpreted with caution. But at
least they suggest that the World Bank￿ s complexity measure may be on
to something relevant, and deserves to be considered in the comparison of
common and civil law countries in the next subsection.
2.3 No correlation with legal origins
Table 3 shows regressions of complexity, duration, and cost (country averages
over 2003-2008) on legal origin with and without a control for the level of
development (GDP per capita). Civil procedure in common law countries
is more complex, protracted, and costly than in civil law countries taken as
a whole (panel A), but less so than in French civil law countries considered
separately (panel B). The di⁄erences are small, however, and statistically
insigni￿cant. Both common law countries and French civil law countries do
worse than German and Scandinavian civil law countries, although control-
ling for GDP per capita, only the di⁄erence in complexity to the German
civil law countries is statistically signi￿cant.
In principle, the di⁄erence between the results of table 3 and those re-
ported in the earlier studies could be a timing e⁄ect ￿civil law countries
might have had more complex, protracted, and costly litigation in 2003, but
more than closed the gap by 2008. Indeed, table 4 shows that over the 2003-
2008 time period, common law countries have been decreasing procedural
complexity and duration at lower rates than civil law countries.4 Unreported
tests with levels show that in 2003, civil procedure in common law countries
was less complex and protracted than in civil law countries. The di⁄erence in
2003, however, was only about one quarter standard deviation and not sta-
tistically signi￿cant. Moreover, procedure in German and Scandinavian civil
law countries was less complex and protracted than in common law countries
already in 2003, even controlling for GDP per capita. In sum, based on the
corrected data, there is no evidence of a di⁄erence between common and civil
law countries at any point during the period 2003-2008.
4Estimates with the lagged level of the dependent variable as additional regressor, or
without the control for changes in GDP per capita, are almost identical.
73 Formalism
The initial Doing Business report (World Bank [2004]) and its background
study (Djankov et al. [2003]) also found a strong correlation between
legal origin and their "formalism index."5 This index was discontinued in
subsequent reports. But if the early data gave an inaccurate picture of legal
origin￿ s role for complexity, duration, and cost, as documented in section 2
above, the formalism index from the same early data set is likely to su⁄er
from similar shortcomings. Shedding light on this issue is important because
the formalism index has been used in widely in￿ uential studies probing the
role of legal origin.6
In the absence of comprehensive new data, the Appendix to this paper
analyzes the formalism index for eviction procedures in 2003 in the three
origin countries England, France, and Germany, as well as in the United
States.7 These are only four countries out of a population of about 200. As
origin countries, however, they provide special leverage in the context of legal
family comparisons and the theory of legal origins. The legal families span
the world because "[t]he regulatory regimes of most developing countries are
not indigenous ￿they are shaped by their colonial heritage" from the ori-
gin countries who "brought with them their laws and institutions" (World
Bank [2004], p. xiv; cf. Djankov et al. [2003], p. 458). Hence if civil
law countries as a whole were more formalist than common law countries, it
should be because France and Germany are more formalist than England.
The numbers for evictions in 2003 derived in the Appendix, however, do
not bear out such di⁄erences between the origin countries. Table 5 shows
these numbers in comparison to the original numbers from Djankov et
al. [2003]. It shows both the "formalism index" (net of the steps subindex)
and the unweighted sum of its components; in each case, it shows formalism
5This index is the weighted sum of 28 binary indicators encoding deviations from a
stylized informal procedure that commences without formalities such as written summons,
does not involve legal professionals, is entirely oral, does not regulate the submission or
evaluation of evidence, does not require legal justi￿cation of the parties￿positions or the
judge￿ s decision, and does not allow appeals (World Bank [2004], pp. 109-110). For
more details, see Djankov et al. [2003] (table 1) and the Appendix to this paper.
6E.g., Acemoglu and Johnson [2005]; Rosenthal and Voeten [2007]; Balas et
al. [2009].
7The US was added to the list of origin countries because owing to changes in English
civil procedure, particularly recent ones, the US today corresponds more closely to the
traditional common law model than England (Pound [1921]; St￿rner [2004]).
8not only as required by law (i.e., the legal minimum of formalist elements)
but also as actually practiced in the courts (i.e., including formalist choices
of judges and litigants). According to the revised weighted data, France is
the most formalist, but Germany is the least formalist, and the di⁄erences
are small, much smaller than in the original data. Moreover, the di⁄erences
that do remain result from the weighting scheme, which is arbitrary. In the
unweighted data, the countries are almost indistinguishable.
The Appendix identi￿es the index components for which its results di⁄er
from those of Djankov et al. [2003]. The source of the discrepancies
cannot be traced further because Djankov et al. [2003] does not pro-
vide a detailed data documentation explaining its coding. By contrast, the
Appendix to this paper explains all its coding decisions and documents all
relevant legal source materials compliant with standards of legal writing. The
information was compiled by an English barrister, a French law graduate, a
German Assessor, and a New York attorney in many weeks of work.8
The analysis in the Appendix and its results shown in table 5 only refer to
eviction proceedings. Djankov et al. [2003] also provided data for check
collection proceedings, and World Bank [2004] provided data for a simple
contract dispute (see section 2.1 above). Eviction proceedings, however, are
those for which these two studies found the greatest di⁄erences between com-
mon and civil law (as measured by a t-statistic). If these di⁄erences exist,
they should have been visible here.
The argument for the special leverage of data from the origin countries
implicitly assumed that di⁄erences present during the time their legal systems
spread throughout the world persist to this day. It is possible that erstwhile
di⁄erences between the origin countries diminished after decolonization (or
even before) but persist in the former colonies (Merryman [1996]). At least
for formalism in small claims litigation as investigated here, however, this
argument is not consistent with the historical record. The French revolution
instituted a fully non-formalist small claims procedure (juges de paix) that
remained in existence until the 1970s (Fricero [2003]). By contrast, com-
mon law procedure was notoriously cumbersome, leading to the creation of
small claims courts in common law jurisdictions starting only in the 1970s
(Whelan [1990]). Many components of the formalism index such as the
8The latter three are the author of this paper. The French and the German compilation
were also reviewed by a French and a German judge, respectively, who partially specialize
in eviction proceedings.
9hearsay rule or the requirement for parties to cite applicable law are tradi-
tionally associated with common law, not civil law.9
In sum, the re-examination of the formalism index for the three origin
countries and the United States, viewed against the background of the sub-
stantial systematic measurement error in the other three measures of the
initial World Bank data set discussed in section 2 above, gives strong reason
to doubt that civil procedure in civil law countries is more formalist than in
common law countries, as the earlier studies had found.
4 Other aspects of civil procedure
So far, this paper has shown that measures of civil procedure constructed
by the World Bank and a¢ liated researchers, and collected by the World
Bank and in one instance (formalism) speci￿cally for this paper, do not
show systematic di⁄erences between common and civil law countries. As
mentioned in the introduction, however, these measures are conceptually
limited. In particular, they do not address appeals, which are believed to
be more frequent in civil law countries and can be a major source of delay.
Nor do they address the quality of judicial decisions. Unfortunately, data of
comparable quality covering these aspects do not exist.
4.1 BERI data on enforceability of contracts
To get at least some handle on these other aspects of civil procedure, this
paper follows Djankov et al. [2003] and uses a subjective measure of
the enforceability of contracts from Business Environment Risk Intelligence
(BERI), a U.S.-based commercial provider. As part of an overall country
risk measure provided to potential foreign investors, BERI assesses whether
contracting partners in 98 countries generally honor contracts, and whether
authorities apply and enforce laws facilitating this.10 Any shortcomings of a
9The traditional civil law attitude is expressed in the maxims "da mi factum, dabo tibi
ius" (give me the facts, I will give you the law) and "curia novit ius" (the court knows the
law); the traditional common law attitude is the opposite (Mann [1977]).
10The precise questions were (email from BERI to the author of March 11, 2009)
"1. Does the party generally honor both the terms of the contract and the process of
enforcement within the country during the contract￿ s duration or for an extended period
of time when no time limit is involved?;
"2. Do authorities apply/enforce laws and regulations that motivate the party with
whom you have the contract to honor the contract￿ s terms?"
10country￿ s civil procedure system should be re￿ ected in this measure, possibly
confounded with extralegal enforcement mechanisms.
Table 6 shows results from regressing enforceability of contracts in 2003
on legal families and, depending on speci￿cation, the level of development
(GDP per capita), a dummy for transition countries, and Transparency In-
ternational￿ s Corruption Perception Index (rescaled). The BERI data are
rescaled to have mean zero and a standard deviation of one, and to be in-
creasing in quality.
Unlike the more objective data discussed in the previous two sections,
the enforceability data do show some systematic di⁄erence between common
and civil law countries. On average, enforceability is one third of a stan-
dard deviation lower in civil law countries, although this estimate is noisy
(t = 1:6) (model 1). Controlling for the level of development, the di⁄er-
ence grows to half a standard deviation and becomes highly statistically
signi￿cant, whether or not one controls for the status of transition countries
(t > 3:2) (models 3 and 5). A comparison of these estimates with model 7
suggests that about half of this di⁄erential between common and civil law
countries is explained by higher corruption in civil law countries.
The full picture is, however, more complicated. As models 2, 4, and 6
show, the di⁄erences between common and civil law countries are driven by
the French civil law countries. By contrast, the German and Scandinavian
civil law countries do even better than the common law countries (model
2). It is true that controlling for GDP per capita, the common law mean is
higher than the German mean (t = 1:67) (model 4). On the other hand, the
conditional means are identical if one also accounts for the special circum-
stances of transition countries (model 6), many of which are today counted
as belonging to the German civil law family. The Scandinavian countries do
better than common law countries regardless of controls.
The full pattern emerging from these data is therefore not that common
law countries receive higher subjective enforceability evaluations than civil
law countries, but that the French civil law countries receive lower evalua-
tions than all other groups. It is also possible that these results have nothing
to do with civil procedure per se but with other factors in￿ uencing the en-
forceability of contracts. At a minimum, however, these data reinforce the
initial observation that relevant legal family di⁄erences may exist in areas
Some further details about BERI￿ s assembly of the data can be found at
http://www.beri.com/brs.asp.
11and dimensions of civil procedure not covered by the Doing Business data.
4.2 WBES data on consistency and con￿dence in the legal system
Another source of subjective procedural quality measures used in Djankov
et al. [2003] is the World Bank￿ s World Business Environment Survey
(WBES) of over 10,000 businesspeople in 80 jurisdictions between 1998 and
2000. The WBES contained questions on the consistency of, and con￿dence
in, the country￿ s dispute resolution system. By these measures, common law
judiciaries perform signi￿cantly better than civil law jurisdictions except the
Scandinavians (unreported).
The measures are suspect for various reasons though. First, it appears
that correspondents were not chosen by random sampling. Second, major
patterns in the data are implausible ￿for example, the level of development
(GDP per capita) explains only 6% of the variation of the consistency mea-
sure, and the ￿ve countries with the most consistent dispute resolution are
supposed to be Botswana, Egypt, Namibia, Tunisia, and, more credibly, Sin-
gapore, far ahead of countries such as Canada, France, Germany, the UK, or
the United States. Third, to the extent that other WBES procedure mea-
sures can be compared to more objective measures from other sources, the
comparison suggests that the WBES data are mostly noise: as shown in table
7, WBES measures of a⁄ordability and speed are hardly correlated with cost
and duration, respectively, as measured by World Bank [2004], [2009a]
(2003 data) or Djankov et al. [2003], [2008].
5 Conclusion: Legal origins?
This paper shed doubt on the empirical claim that civil procedure is more
complex and formalist and therefore less e¢ cient in civil law countries than
in common law countries. The best quality data ￿complexity, duration,
and cost from World Bank [2009a] ￿show no di⁄erence between common
and civil law countries. These data revise and supersede some of the very
data that gave rise to the claim in the ￿rst place (World Bank [2004]).
Formalism data from the same ￿rst generation data set might be open to
similar revisions but were discontinued by the World Bank. Consistent with
this suspicion, new hand-collected data on formalism in four origin jurisdic-
tions show little evidence of a common/civil law split, unlike the original
data. Since these four origin countries are the source of much of the law of
12other countries in the world, the ￿nding suggests that accurately measured
formalism would not be higher in civil law jurisdictions than in common law
jurisdictions either.
The only indication that common law countries might have superior civil
procedure systems comes from subjective data on the enforceability of con-
tracts, which provide a broader picture of civil procedure. At the same time,
German and Scandinavian civil law countries seem to do even better than
common law countries by this measure, which may also confound civil pro-
cedure with extralegal enforcement mechanisms. Still, these data underline
the possibility that economically meaningful legal family di⁄erences may ex-
ist in areas and dimensions of civil procedure not covered by the high quality
World Bank data. In this connection, it is noteworthy that Djankov et al.
[2008] have recently documented signi￿cant di⁄erences between legal families
in a more specialized branch of procedure, bankruptcy.
If con￿rmed, the lack of di⁄erences between common and civil law coun-
tries at least in courts of ￿rst instance would be remarkable in itself. As
mentioned in the introduction, the historical divergence of common law and
civil law started in civil procedure and remains most pronounced there today.
It is true that the evidence presented in this paper does not directly address
what are traditionally considered the key di⁄erences between common and
civil law procedure, such as the role of the judge in the administration of
evidence, the schedule of the trial or process, and, most regrettably, the
role of appeals. The evidence does suggest, however, that these structural
di⁄erences, if they are indeed systematic, do not have repercussions on the
measurable quality of civil procedure, at least in the standard contract lit-
igation scenario covered by the Doing Business data, which does not allow
for appeals.
The ￿ndings of this paper are also relevant for interpreting di⁄erences
between common and civil law countries in other domains ranging from in-
vestor protection to military conscription, which have been documented in
the legal origins literature (La Porta et al. 2008). To start, some studies
in this ￿eld have used the procedural indicators of World Bank [2004] and
Djankov et al. [2003] to disentangle the e⁄ects of di⁄erent institutions
and their historic causes (e.g., Acemoglu and Johnson [2005]; Beck,
Demirg￿￿-Kunt, and Levine [2003]; Rosenthal and Voeten [2007]).
The results of these studies might di⁄er with revised data.
More generally, if the historical common/civil law division does not man-
ifest itself economically meaningfully in the area where it originates, it is
13unlikely to explain di⁄erences in much more remote areas. Rules and out-
comes in areas such as military conscription may be correlated with legal
families (Mulligan and Shleifer [2005]), but the explanation for this
need not reside in historical di⁄erences between common and civil law.11
The legal families are largely congruent with the (former) spheres of in￿ u-
ence of di⁄erent European powers, who di⁄er by more than the "origin" of
their legal system in the common or civil law. For example, Rostowski
and Stacescu [2006] explain di⁄erences in growth outcomes between for-
mer English and French colonies with di⁄erent colonial education policies
rather than di⁄erences of the legal regime. Spamann [2009b] shows that to-
day the former colonies continue to import regulatory blueprints from their
respective former colonizers for reasons that seem to have little to do with "in-
trinsic" di⁄erences of common and civil law. At home, England historically
di⁄ered from France and other European countries on more than the legal di-
mension, and many theories attempting to explain why today￿ s Anglo-Saxon
countries are more market-oriented than Continental European ones do not
invoke di⁄erences between common and civil law (e.g., Esping-Andersen
[1990]; Hall and Soskice [2001]; Roe [2006]). The question will surely
continue to generate exciting research. This paper suggests, however, that
civil procedure is probably not the right place to look for an answer.
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16Table 1: Corresponding variables (2003 values): Spearman￿ s ￿
steps WB (2009) WB (2004) DLLS(c) DLLS(e)
WB (2009) 1
WB (2004) 0.33 1
DLLS(c) 0.25 0.83 1
DLLS(e) 0.11 0.74 0.84 1
days WB (2009) WB (2004) DLLS(c) DLLS(e)
WB (2009) 1
WB (2004) 0.53 1
DLLS(c) 0.47 0.81 1
DLLS(e) 0.32 0.45 0.50 1
cost WB (2009) WB (2004) DLLS(c) DLLS(e)
WB (2009) 1
WB (2004) 0.54 1
formalism WB (2009) WB (2004) DLLS(c) DLLS(e)
WB (2004) 1
DLLS(c) 0.90 1
DLLS(e) 0.82 0.83 1
WB = World Bank; DLLS = Djankov et al. (2003)
c = check collection; e = eviction
17Table 2: The e⁄ects of complexity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(days) ln(days) ln(cost) ln(cost) ln(cost) enforce
Panel A: Levels
ln(steps) 0.90*** 0.82*** 0.50* -0.30 -0.19 -1.22***
(0.21) (0.24) (0.26) (0.23) (0.20) (0.31)
ln(GDP pc) -0.03 -0.30*** -0.29*** 0.63***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Year 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.78 -1.86 30.1 19.8 -3.20 -1.32
(9.25) (11.4) (20.7) (26.4) (12.7) (1.41)
N 970 747 970 747 743 88
J 181 169 181 169 168 88
R2 0.12 0.12 0.02 0.30 0.37 0.70
Panel B: First di⁄erences
ln(steps) 1.38*** 1.40*** 0.10 0.20 0.36**
(0.41) (0.45) (0.22) (0.22) (0.15)
ln(GDP pc) -0.01 -0.22 -0.02
(0.05) (0.21) (0.04)
Constant -0.004*** -0.006** -0.009 -0.004 -0.000
(0.001) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.001)
N 789 578 789 578 575
J 181 167 181 167 166
R2 0.13 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.02
Model 5 omits Bhutan, which accounts for 98% of the variance of ￿ln(cost)
"enforce" is enforceability of contracts in 2003 from BERI
GDP per capita data for 2003-2007 are PPP-adjusted and come from WDI online
All other data are for 2003-2008 (model 6: 2003 only) and come from World Bank (2009)
Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < :1, ** p < :05, *** p < :01
18Table 3: Legal origin and procedural complexity, duration, and cost
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(steps) ln(steps) ln(days) ln(days) ln(cost) ln(cost)
Panel A: common law vs. civil law
Civil law -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08)
ln(GDP pc) -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.27***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 3.64 4.08 6.32 7.05 3.35 5.69
(0.02) (0.09) (0.06) (0.25) (0.08) (0.27)
R2 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.33
N 179 169 179 169 179 169
Panel B: common law vs. civil law subgroups
French 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09)
German -0.13*** -0.09* -0.21* -0.16 -0.40*** -0.16
(0.05) (0.04) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14)
Scandinavian -0.21** -0.11 -0.44** -0.33 -0.74*** -0.25
(0.08) (0.08) (0.22) (0.23) (0.28) (0.25)
ln(GDP pc) -0.04*** -0.06** -0.25***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 3.64 3.99 6.32 6.85 3.35 5.53
(0.02) (0.09) (0.06) (0.26) (0.08) (0.29)
R2 0.09 0.19 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.34
N 179 169 179 169 179 169
The data are country averages for the period 2003-2008 (models 2, 4, and 6: 2003-2007)
The legal origin classi￿cation is from La Porta et al. (2008)
GDP per capita data are PPP-adjusted and come from WDI online
All other data are from World Bank (2009)
OLS standard errors in parentheses
* p < :1, ** p < :05, *** p < :01
19Table 4: Legal-origin speci￿c time trends 2003-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
￿ln(steps) ￿ln(steps) ￿ln(days) ￿ln(days) ￿ln(cost) ￿ln(cost)
Civil law -0.0025** -0.0043 0.0406
(0.0013) (0.0040) (0.0431)
French -0.0022* -0.0031 0.0399
(0.0013) (0.0042) (0.0426)
German -0.0047** -0.0101 0.0461
(0.0021) (0.0072) (0.0474)
Scandinavian 0.0001 -0.0034 0.0315
(0.0012) (0.0089) (0.0387)
￿ln(GDP pc) -0.0124 -0.0077 -0.0287 -0.0184 -0.2852 -0.2981
(0.0144) (0.0134) (0.0522) (0.0521) (0.2603) (0.2693)
Constant 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0049 -0.0053 -0.0309 -0.0305
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0323) (0.0321)
N 578 578 578 578 578 578
J 167 167 167 167 167 167
R2 0.009 0.014 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.005
The legal origin classi￿cation is from La Porta et al. (2008)
GDP per capita data are PPP-adjusted and come from WDI online
All other data are from World Bank (2009)
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < :1, ** p < :05, *** p < :01
Table 5: Formalism index for evictions (2003) (net of steps subindex)
DE FR GB US
weighted Djankov et al. [2003] 3.38 3.54 2.08 2.75
Law-on-books 1.83 2.76 2.33 2.42
Practice 2.37 2.96 2.53 2.62
unweighted Djankov et al. [2003] 17 15 10 12
Law-on-books 8 11 10.25 11
Practice 11.5 12 11 12
20Table 6: Legal origin and the enforceability of contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Civil law -0.36 -0.51*** -0.45*** -0.21*
(0.22) (0.13) (0.14) (0.11)
French -0.67*** -0.62*** -0.55*** -0.23**
(0.21) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11)
German 0.23 -0.30* -0.03 0.13
(0.28) (0.18) (0.21) (0.17)
Scandinav. 1.22** 0.21 0.25 -0.32
(0.47) (0.30) (0.30) (0.25)
ln(GDP pc) 0.71*** 0.65*** 0.70*** 0.62*** 0.20*** 0.16**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08)
Transition -0.21 -0.37** -0.01 -0.18
(0.15) (0.16) (0.12) (0.13)
Corruption -0.29*** -0.29***
(0.03) (0.04)
Constant 0.26 0.26 -6.01 -5.49 -5.94 -5.23 -0.02 0.31
(0.19) (0.17) (0.47) (0.48) (0.47) (0.48) (0.82) (0.84)
N 98 98 95 95 95 95 93 93
R2 0.03 0.24 0.69 0.72 0.69 0.73 0.82 0.83
The dependent variable is enforceability of contracts in 2003 from BERI
The legal origin classi￿cation is from La Porta et al. (2008)
GDP per capita data for 2003 are PPP-adjusted and come from WDI online)
"Transition" is socialist legal origin from La Porta et al. (1999)
"Corruption" is 10 minus Transparency International￿ s Corruption Perception Index 2003
OLS standard errors in parentheses
* p < :1, ** p < :05, *** p < :01
Table 7: WBES and objective measures: Spearman￿ s ￿
WB (2009) WB (2004) DLLS(c) DLLS(e) DHMS
quick / days -.34 -.38 -.49 -.36 -.27
a⁄ordable / cost -.06 .01 -.01
WB = World Bank; DLLS = Djankov et al. (2003); DHMS = Djankov et al. (2008)











This Appendix analyzes the law applicable to an eviction procedure in England, France, Germany, 
and the USA with a view to generating, for these countries, values on the “formalism index”, as defined in 
Djankov et al. (2003) with additional clarifications from World Bank (2004).
1 
The preliminary Part I provides more detail on the hypothetical case under consideration and 
discusses how this Appendix deals with ambiguities of variable definitions in general, and with 
discretionary choices of the parties and the judge in the procedure in particular.  Part II successively 
considers each of the seven subindices of the “formalism index”.  Part III discusses aggregate index values 
under different weighting and coding schemes.  The results are summarized numerically in comparison to 
values of Djankov et al. (2003) in the table at the end of this Appendix (which also reproduces the index 
component definitions); the text presents the explanations and references behind those numbers. 
 
The English data were initially compiled by Sarah Ford. 
                                                           
1 Relevant statutes, cases, and other materials are cited according to local convention.  
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I.  PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
A.  More details on the hypothetical case under consideration 
As mentioned above, and following Djankov et al. (2003), the hypothetical case under consideration is an 
eviction proceeding by the landlord against a residential tenant for failure to pay rent in the most populous 
city in every jurisdiction, i.e., Paris, Berlin, London, and New York City for France, Germany, England, 
and the US, respectively.  The choice of city is very important for the US, since the relevant procedure is 
regulated by state law.  In what follows, this Appendix therefore generally refers to New York law for 
short. 
Note in this connection that England and New York City provide special procedures for eviction 
claims:  the possession claim under CPR Part 55 in England, and the non-payment variant of the summary 
proceeding to recover possession of real property under RPAPL § 732 in New York City.
2 
To match the other data in World Bank (2004) (Djankov et al. 2003 do not provide a reference 
date), this Appendix generally refers to the law in force in 2003, but also mentions changes in the 
immediately preceding years in the footnotes. 
Many details of the case facts and litigants’ and judges’ behavior bear on the index values.   
Djankov et al. (2003, 460) specify that the parties do not settle, and that compliance with the judgment is 
not voluntary. To fill in remaining gaps, the present discussion relies on further details provided in World 
Bank (2004).  These include, in particular, that each party attempts to call one witness, that the claimant is 
100% right, and that the court decides every motion for the claimant and grants the claimant’s claim in its 
entirety (109). 
B.  Choices by parties and judges 
Unfortunately, the details provided in Djankov et al. (2003) and World Bank (2004) do not address all 
relevant issues, even assuming that unusual moves do not happen, such as a request for the disqualification 
of a judge, or, in New York, for a jury trial. 
In particular, the law often grants the parties and/or the judge the choice between “formalist” and 
“non-formalist” alternatives.  For example, English parties can choose whether to introduce written witness 
statements in advance of trial (“formalist”), or oral witness testimony at trial (“non-formalist”).  Similarly, 
German judges can choose whether to request a written opposition by the respondent or not (“formalist” 
and “non-formalist”, respectively).  Which alternative should determine the country’s index value?
3  The 
general approach of this Appendix is to consider both the most “non-formalist” option provided by the law, 
and, alternatively, the option generally chosen in practice.  Initially, the discussion for each component will 
follow Balas et al. (2009 [ms p. 10]) and consider only the black-letter law, i.e., the most “non-formalist” 
option allowed by the law.  The numbers in the table at the end refer to this option.  Then the discussion 
will also note, however, where usual practice does not follow the “non-formalist” approach.  As will be 
                                                           
2 The latter provision is made applicable in New York City by NYCRR 208.42(d).  In England, CPR Part 
55 II also offers an “accelerated possession claim”, but this is confined to a limited class of possession 
claims not in principle based on unpaid rent (CPR Rule 55.11/12: undisputed claims brought under s. 21 
Housing Act 1988 to recover possession under an assured shorthold tenancy), and hence the present 
discussion refers to the more general procedure.  On the French “procédure de référé” (which is not limited 
to eviction or real estate litigation), see below n. 5 and accompanying text. 
3 Some of the variable definitions in Djankov et al. (2003) are phrased in terms of what is “normally” done, 
“most likely”, etc. in the jurisdiction.  This might suggest that prevailing practice should be decisive.  
However, the language of the variable definitions is not very precise in this regard.  For example, the 
variable “filing” “equals one if the complaint is normally submitted in written form to the court, and zero if 
it can be presented orally.” (Djankov et al. 2003,464 (emphasis added)).  Both “alternatives” can obviously 
be true simultaneously.  
A-3
seen, the distinction is ultimately not crucial for assessing the relative “formalism” of the four 
jurisdictions.
4 
A particularly fundamental choice is that between the French standard procedure (“procédure au 
fond”) and an accelerated and, in theory, preliminary procedure (“procédure en référé”). The discussion 
will generally refer to the latter, which is both less “formalist” and the standard choice of French landlords 
seeking an eviction.
5  The problem is that the “procédure en référé” is not meant to handle seriously 
disputed cases, and would be converted into the standard “procédure au fond” if the judge had a serious 
doubt as to the right outcome of the case.  Hence, if the judge thought that she needed to hear the witnesses 
nominated according to the World Bank instructions, the procedure would be converted.  This would 
change the rules applicable to subsequent actions, which would matter notably for whether appeal suspends 
execution of the judgment.  Since the World Bank instructions indicate, however, that the claimant is 100% 
right and the judge decides all motions for the claimant, it appears reasonable to assume that the judge will 
not consider it necessary to hear the proffered witness testimony and hence will not convert the procedure; 
this also corresponds to the reality of eviction proceedings where in the great majority of cases the 
respondents have no serious defense to offer (in fact, most do not even appear at trial, so that default 
judgment is entered against them). 
C.  Ambiguous variable definitions in general 
Beyond parties’ and judges’ choices, ambiguous variable definitions are a more general problem.  The 
discussion of the individual index components will reveal many more instances of it. 
Given that the “formalism index” has 22 components, it is impractical to consider all possible 
permutations of different component interpretations, as done in Spamann (forthcoming) for the 
“antidirector rights index” (for example, with two possible interpretations per component, the number of 
permutations would be 2
22).  Fortunately, considering all permutations also appears unnecessary.  The goal 
of the present exercise is to evaluate the formalism of civil procedure in the four key jurisdictions by the 
measure of the “formalism index”, but otherwise independently of Djankov et al. (2003).  This goal is well 
served by choosing in each case the most sensible interpretation, while indicating how different choices 
would influence the result. 
As a byproduct, the discussion of component definitions’ interpretation will demonstrate many 
occasions for misunderstanding that can wreak havoc on the consistency of data collected with the help of a 
large group of unconnected contributors. 
                                                           
4 See below n. 51 and 53 and accompanying text. 
5 See JCl Proc. Civ. Fasc. 382 no. 26 et seq. (1995).  
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II.   LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A.  “Professionals vs. Laymen”
6 
In all four jurisdictions, eviction proceedings are heard by a professional judge, but representation by a 
licensed attorney is not mandatory (in New York, legal representation would be required if the party were a 
corporation).
7  In three jurisdictions, the competent court would be a specialized “small claims” court:  the 
“Tribunal d’Instance” in France, the “Amtsgericht” in Germany, and the Housing Part of the New York 
City Civil Court in the US.
8  In England, however, the “possession proceeding” must usually be litigated in 
the County Court, which is a court of general jurisdiction.
9 
B.  “Written vs. Oral” 
The complaint must be filed in writing in all jurisdictions except Germany.
10  In Germany, submissions to 
the “Amtsgericht” may be made orally to the clerk of the court, even though litigants practically never avail 
themselves of this opportunity (indicating that the use of written documents can actually simplify things).
11 
                                                           
6 Quotations without attribution come from the subindex and component definitions in Table 1 in Djankov 
et al. (2003), which are reproduced in full in the table at the end of this Appendix. 
7 On the possibility to litigate without a lawyer, see Art. 827 NCPC (applicable also in “référé” procedures, 
see JCl Proc. Civ. Fasc. 382 no. 5 [1995]), § 78 ZPO, and for England Andrews para. 6.07-08.  The New 
York exception is in CPLR § 321(a). 
8 See Art. L. 321-2-1 COJ (formerly Art. R. 321-2 COJ); § 23 no. 2(a) GVG; and CCA § 110(a)(5) and 
NYCRR 208.42(a).  That being said, France and Germany have even “smaller” courts and procedures, 
respectively, that are not applicable in the eviction case:  the “juge de proximité” in France, and the judge’s 
discretionary choice of procedure in claims involving less than €600 in Germany (§ 495a ZPO). 
9 The County Court’s jurisdiction in possession claims is laid down in CPR Rule 55.3(1); CPR Rule 55.3(3) 
with 55PD1.3 provides that a possession claim can be brought in the High Court’s Chancery Division only 
in exceptional circumstances. 
This Appendix follows Djankov et al. (2003) and classifies the County Courts as courts of general 
jurisdiction.  In the final analysis, the reason is that they may hear nearly all types of claims, whereas the 
jurisdiction of the High Court is reserved for important or complex litigation with a value of £15,000 or 
more (cf. 07PD2.1 and 07PD2.4; and Zuckerman on Civil Procedure para. 3.7).  The full argument, 
however, is much more complex than this.  After all, like the competent courts in the other jurisdictions, the 
English County Court is the lowest available court, and it does have jurisdiction over small claims.  The 
mere fact that, by its specific wording, the CPR frame the jurisdiction of the High Court as an exception to 
that of the County Court, rather than the other way around, could hardly be sufficient reason to consider the 
latter a “general” as opposed to “specialized jurisdiction court.”  Nor could the fact that the County Court 
handles the majority of all litigation (Andrews para. 22.02) – this is also true of the courts of the other 
jurisdictions listed above.  Instead, what is determinative here is the considerably higher value threshold of 
County Court jurisdiction compared to these other courts.  As already mentioned, this threshold is at least 
£15,000 (07PD2.1 and 07PD2.2), which is more than four times higher than that of the German 
“Amtsgericht” (€5,000, see §§ 71 I, 23 no. 1 GVG), and more than three times higher than for the French 
“Tribunal d’Instance” until 2003 (€7,600, see the former Art. R 321-1 COJ as amended by decree 2001-373 
of 27 April 2001 with effect 1 January 2002; before that, the amount was FF50,000 since decree 98-1231 of 
28 December 1998; the amount is now €10,000, see Art. L. 321-2, R. 311-1 COJ).  In addition, the £15,000 
threshold is only a lower limit, and other conditions need to be fulfilled for the case to go to the High Court, 
see 07PD2.4. These thresholds imply that the County Court will be much more geared towards sizeable 
claims than the other three courts. 
10 Cf. for England CPR Rules 7.2., 16.2, 55.3(5), 55.4, 22.1, PD55 1.5; for France Art. 53-55, 56 no. 1, 485, 
651 para. 2 NCPC (the declaration to the clerk of the court, Art. 847-1 NCPC, is not applicable even in the 
“procédure au fond”, since the expulsion claim is considered of indeterminate value, see Cass Civ
2 18  
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Service of process is in writing in all four jurisdictions. 
Only England requires that a defense be submitted in writing.
12  France does not require a written 
defense, and oral defense is usual in practice, in part because of the fast pace of the “référé” procedure.
13  
German law does not require any answer before the hearing at the “Amtsgericht” unless the judge explicitly 
demands it from the defendant.
14  Moreover, even if the judge so requires, the defendant may submit any 
defense orally to the clerk of the court, as with the complaint itself.
15  If this were not sufficient for the 
“non-formalist” coding, New York would have to be classified as “formalist” as well:  an answer is always 
required before the hearing of an eviction claim in the New York City Housing Part, but oral submission of 
the answer to the court clerk is possible.
16 
To classify the submission of “evidence” along the “written vs. oral” dimension, one needs to 
distinguish form and timing, as well as different types of evidence that require different answers. The index 
component definition refers to both form (“submitted to the court in written form”) and timing (“presented 
at oral hearings before the judge”). 
•  The question of form, however, is only relevant for witness evidence (by definition, 
documentary evidence is in written form).  Witness evidence must always be given orally in open 
court in Germany and New York, and it may be so given at the choice of the parties and/or the 
judge in England and France.
17  This also answers the question of timing.  Hence all four 
jurisdictions are “non-formalist” for witness evidence. 
•  For documentary evidence, timing is the only relevant question.  Only England requires 
its filing with the court before the hearing; the technicalities are left to a footnote.
18  (In practice, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
October 1978, Bull. Civ. II no. 209 and JCl Proc. Civ. Fasc. 210-2 no. 115 [1999]); for New York CCA § 
902 and CPLR § 304. 
11 § 496 ZPO.  This option is used in less than 1% of the cases brought in the Amtsgericht, see Klaus F. 
Rohl, Small Claims in Civil Court Proceedings in the Federal Republic of Germany, in SMALL CLAIMS 
COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 167 (Christopher J. Whelan ed., Oxford 1990), at 173. 
12 For England, see CPR Rules 15.2, 15.4, 55.7(3)/(4).  It is true that the only penalty for not filing a written 
defense is with respect to cost.  Still, that should be sufficient legal motivation for a defendant to file the 
written defense. 
13 Cf. Art. 843 para. 1 NCPC (“La procédure est orale.”) and Serge Guinchard, MÉGA NOUVEAU CODE DE 
PROCÉDURE CIVILE 834 n. 017 (Dalloz, 2
nd ed. 2001) (reporting the oral practice). 
14 §§ 129 para. 2, 495 ZPO, and see Thomas/Putzo-Reichold
25 § 495 n. 3.  It is true that German judges 
routinely make this demand (cf., e.g., Rohl, above n. 11).  This is irrelevant for coding, however, in light of 
the possibility to submit the defense orally to the clerk discussed in the main text. 
15 § 496 ZPO. 
16 See § 732(3) RPAPL (requirement for defendant to answer before trial), and § 743 RPAPL, 22 NYCRR 
208.42(d) (example notice of petition) (possibility to submit answer orally to clerk of the court). 
17 For Germany, see §§ 355 I, 375 ZPO (exceptions can be made for expert witnesses, see §§ 402, 411 
ZPO).   In New York, it seems there is no statutory provision explicitly addressing this (to New York 
lawyers) self-evident point, but see, e.g., the New York City Housing Part’s instructions to litigants on its 
website:  http://www.courts.state.ny.us/publications/L&TPamphlet.pdf (visited 13 October 2006).  In 
England and France, the parties and/or the judge also have the choice to introduce testimony in the form of 
affidavits, see for England CPR Rule 55.8(3)(b), and for France Art. 199 NCPC.  For France, these sections 
refer to the full “au fond” procedure; as mentioned in Part A.2 above, an oral interrogation of witnesses 
should and does never happen in a “référé” procedure. 
18 In New York, the parties bring their documentary evidence with them to the trial, see the document cited 
in the previous note.  By contrast, in England 55PD5.1 specifies that “[e]ach party should wherever 
possible include all the evidence he wishes to present in his statement of case” (i.e., the documents filed to  
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witness statements predominate in easy English cases, and German litigants routinely attach 
copies of documents to their pleadings.) 
In sum, dividing the coding equally between form and timing, and between witness and 
documentary evidence, France, Germany, and the US should be considered fully “non-formalist” and 
England ¼ “formalist” for “evidence”. 
Final arguments are given orally in all four jurisdictions. 
The laws of all four jurisdictions also allow or even prefer that judgment be given orally directly at 
the close of the hearing.
19  (Djankov et al. 2003 classify all four jurisdictions as rendering written 
judgments; this is probably a reflection of the prevailing practice.
20)  If this is so, “notification of judgment” 
will be oral as well (since this component seems to duplicate the previous one, one might want to omit it 
from the index; this is done for the count of practice below). 
All jurisdictions rely on written documents for enforcement, which seems to be the only 
practicable solution. 
C.  “Legal Justification” 
None of the four jurisdictions requires the complaint to contain references to “specific articles of the law or 
case-law”, or other “legal reasoning”.
21  From this perspective, they should all be classified as “non-
formalist” for the index component “complaint must be legally justified”.  There is an ambiguity in the 
component definition, however, that might warrant the opposite conclusion.  Unlike the second sentence of 
the definition, the first sentence also mentions “formalities that would normally require legal training” as 
grounds for a “formalist” classification.  Since all countries would be coded alike under either definition, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
start the proceeding or in defense, cf. CPR Rule 2.3.(1)); cf. CPR Rule 55.8(4), which demands that “all 
witness statements must be filed and served at least 2 days before the hearing.”  For France and Germany, 
note first that the respondent’s documentary evidence will automatically be filed in open court if an answer 
before the hearing is not required (see previous paragraph in the main text).  For the rest, one needs to 
distinguish carefully between communication to the other party (i.e., a form of disclosure) and 
communication to the court.  Only the former is required before trial, even though in practice the court will 
often receive the documents at the same time.  In France, Art. 132 NCPC requires that the parties 
communicate documents they are relying on to each other without delay (“communication … spontanée”), 
but this does not mean they have to give them to the court in advance of the hearing; Art. 56 para. 2 NCPC 
merely requires that the complaint contain a list of the documents that will be relied on.  Similarly, in 
Germany § 131 I, III ZPO requires that copies of referenced documents be attached to the complaint or 
other pleading only if the other party does not yet have knowledge of them, which means in particular that 
it is not necessary to attach a copy of the lease agreement in an eviction proceeding. 
19 Art. 450 para. 1, § 310 para. 1 ZPO; CPLR § 4213(c); for England cf. Andrews para. 34.35-37. 
20 In spite of the codes’ preference to the contrary, French judges virtually never give judgment directly at 
the end of the hearing, and German judges only rarely so (in about 10% of the cases); cf. Guinchard, 
Megacode NCPC, p. 458 no. 008 (France); Schellhammer
10 ¶ 728 (Germany).  Steven Weller, John C. 
Ruhnka & John A. Martin, American Small Claims Courts, in Whelan (ed.), above n. 11, 5, at 15-16, report 
the tendency of many judges to reserve judgment for US small claims courts generally; specific information 
on the New York City Housing Part’s practice was unavailable. 
21 For France and Germany, this should be expected from the old civil law maxims “da mi factum, dabo tibi 
ius” and “curia novit ius”.  Cf. for Germany § 253 para. 2 ZPO.  In France since 1998, Art. 56 no. 2 NCPC 
requires that the complaint contain an exposition of the factual and legal arguments (“exposé des moyens 
en fait et en droit”).  But this would be fulfilled in an eviction case by a simple reference to the tenant’s 
default of payment.  
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however, this distinction is ultimately without relevance for present purposes, and the details can be 
relegated to a footnote.
22  The coding below treats all four jurisdictions as “non-formalist”. 
Nor do any of the four jurisdictions require that the judgment “expressly state the legal 
justification (articles of the law or case-law).”  It is true that all three jurisdictions require some justification 
of the judgment, that the French and German statutes also require legal justification, and that as a matter of 
practice courts in all four jurisdictions will often explicitly mention statutes and (except in France) 
precedents.  But neither jurisdiction requires specific references to statutes or precedents, as demanded by 
the component definition.
23  Applying the component definition literally seems appropriate for two reasons.  
First, and generally, a literal reading of variable definitions commends itself to avoid confusion in the 
collection and verification of data, i.e., to enable replication by other researchers.  Second, the literal 
reading also makes more sense in the present case: requiring explicit citations to statutory provisions and 
precedents does indeed seem “formalist”, but a simple requirement to give reasons in – i.e., to explain! – a 
judgment seems more like a reflection of a fundamental right of the losing party (or, put differently, an 
important device for ensuring the population’s continued acceptance of the legal system).
24 
The question whether “judgment must be on law (not on equity)” requires some interpretation 
because “equity” has a specific and legal meaning in the Common Law world, which cannot be translated 
into Civil Law terminology (even though the substantive solutions may be the same).  Presumably, the 
definition refers to equity in a non-technical sense like “fairness”.  That still leaves the question how to 
classify broad standards within the fabric of legal rules, such as “good faith” or “reasonableness”.  Given 
that such standards are ubiquitous, however, it appears more appropriate to focus only on grants of 
complete judicial discretion, as in “amiable composition”, “freies Ermessen”, or “just and equitable”.  None 
                                                           
22 To start any legal proceeding in these four jurisdictions tends to be overwhelming for a layman-novice 
(even if experienced “laymen” may know the procedure and substantive law better than a lawyer who does 
not practice in the particular field).  Cf. the advise on the New York Housing Part’s website 
(http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/nyc/housing/represent.shtml, visited 27 August 2006):  “If you are, or 
may be, a party in our court we strongly suggest that you consult an attorney to fully determine your legal 
rights and the best way of handling your legal problem.”  Similar instructions were issued in England, see 
Christopher J. Whelan, Small Claims in England and Wales, in Whelan (ed.), above n. 11, 99, at 124-28.  
In German Amtsgericht procedures generally (i.e., not limited to landlord and tenant disputes), lawyers 
were involved in 86.6 % of the cases in 1984, see Rohl, above n. 11; this does not seem to have changed 
since. 
England and New York require, for example, the use of a specific claim form for the complaint that must 
also be verified by a statement of truth, while France and Germany require certain content that may be 
common sense but that a layman might still not think about (such as the precise address of the defendant, or 
the name of the court).  Cf. in England 55 PD 1.5, CPR Rules 22.1, 55.4; in France Art. 836, 56, 648 
NCPC; in Germany §§ 130, 253 ZPO, 65 GKG; in New York RPAPL §§ 732(4), 741, and NYCRR 
208.42(d).  All jurisdictions have mechanisms other than attorneys to help laymen cope with those troubles:  
online forms and instructions in England, pro se clerks in New York, the sheriff (“huissier”) in France, and 
the court clerk in Germany. The English forms are available online with instructions at www.hmcourts-
service.gov.uk (visited 27 August 2006).  In France, the “huissier” who must be used for service of process 
would in fact draft the document to be served.  For Germany, this is based on the assumption of oral filing 
of the complaint, as discussed above, in which case the court clerk would presumably see to it that the 
claimant add any missing information.  For the provision of pro se clerks in New York, see CCA § 110(o); 
the necessary forms are also available at stationery shops. 
23 Cf. for England Andrews ch. 5.B; for France Art. 454, 455-1 NCPC (“Le jugement doit être motivé.” – 
the legal basis must be clear, but can be implicit, see JCl Civ. Proc. Fasc. 508 nos. 33-36); for Germany § 
313 para. 1 no. 6, para. 3 ZPO (at least in simple cases, the need for legal justification does not mean that 
the judge needs to reference statutes and precedents explicitly, see Zöller
25-Vollkommer § 313 n. 19; the 
divergent opinion of MüKo-ZPO
2-Musielak § 313 no. 15 seems unfounded); CPLR 4213(b) and NYCRR 
208.43(i). 
24 See Weller, Ruhnka & Martin, above n. 20, at 15.  
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of the four jurisdiction grants the judge such powers in eviction proceedings.
25  (Djankov et al. 2003 reach 
the same conclusion.) 
D.  “Statutory Regulation of Evidence” 
Both England and France depart from the erstwhile “liberal democracy consensus” in civil procedure that 
the parties control the evidence, i.e., that the judge may not request by his own motion evidence not offered 
by the parties.
26  The dividing line in this respect now runs between England and France on the one hand, 
and Germany and New York on the other, rather than between the Common and Civil Law countries. 
Judges in all four jurisdictions can reject irrelevant evidence.
27 
The hearsay rule applies in the New York City Housing Part, so that “[o]ut-of-court statements are 
inadmissible” in New York; in England, the hearsay rule has been abolished; France and Germany never 
had it.
28 
All jurisdictions require a “written or magnetic record of all evidence introduced at trial”; England 
and New York even require that the hearing be recorded in its entirety, while a summary protocol suffices 
in France and Germany.
29 
Only France reserves the interrogation of witnesses and parties exclusively to the judge.
30  One 
might wonder whether this includes, a fortiori, the requirement of the preceding index component that “the 
judge must pre-qualify the questions before they are asked to the witness.”  France would then qualify as 
“formalist” on both variables.  Djankov et al. (2003), however, do not treat the latter variable in this way. 
With respect to documentary evidence, the easy part is that all four jurisdictions allow uncertified 
copies in evidence.  The hard part is to say whether in any of them “the authenticity and probative value of 
documentary evidence is specifically defined by the law”, or whether “all admissible documentary 
evidence is freely weighted by the judge” (emphasis added).  To answer that question precisely, one would 
have to know what type of documentary evidence is being used for what proposition.  This is because all 
four jurisdictions know some rules of this type.
31  For a simple eviction proceeding for failure to pay rent, it 
                                                           
25 For New York, cf. PNY Realty Corp. v. Chong Leung Restaurant, 116 Misc.2d 1035, at 1038 (1982) 
(Housing Part has no general equity jurisdiction). 
26 See CPR Rule 32.1; Art. 10, 143 NCPC (limit:  Art. 146 para. 2 NCPC).  §§ 142, 143, 144, 273 II Nr. 2, 
287 I 3, 448 ZPO grant some limited powers to the German judge to request or take certain evidence on her 
own initiative, but these are minor exceptions to the inverse rule. 
27 See Zöller
22-Greger vor § 284 nos. 8b et seq. and Schellhammer
10 ¶¶ 538-541 for Germany, and compare 
with, e.g., Michael M. Martin et al., New York Evidence Handbook (2
nd ed. 2003, Supp. 2004), § 4, in 
particular § 4.1 (one will find that the general statements in the German texts may sound more reserved, but 
the actual cases cited show that the rules operate in much the same way in both jurisdictions).  For England, 
see CPR Rule 32.1;  for France, see Art. 147 NCPC. 
28 Cf. for New York CCA § 110(e) and 22 NYCRR 208.43(h) (providing that the rules of evidence apply in 
the Housing Part), and Michael M. Martin et al., previous note, §8 (explaining the hearsay rule in New 
York).  By contrast, in England the hearsay rule has been abolished in civil proceedings by Section 1(1) 
Civil Evidence Act 1995, even though certain specificities remain (see Sections 2(1) and 4). 
29 See 39 PD 6; Art. 174, 182, 194, 219, 220, 282 NCPC; §§ 160, 510a ZPO; CCA § 110(k). 
30 See Art. 193, 214 NCPC.  By contrast, see § 397 II ZPO in Germany. 
31 E.g., the parol evidence rule in England and New York (in principle, written contract bars evidence of 
earlier or contemporaneous oral terms) (for England, see, e.g., Birk (ed.), English Private Law II, 8.82), or 
the French and German rule that the authentic signature proves that the undersigned made the declaration 
above (subject to counter-proof of fraud etc.), § 416 ZPO, Art. 1316-4 para. 1 CC (on this reading of Art. 
1316-4 CC see JCl. Code Civil Art. 1316 – 1316-4, Fasc. 10 para 38 (2006); on the possibility of proving 
fraud etc., see, e.g., Stein/Jonas-Leipold § 416 nos. 12, 13 (1998)).  
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is however hard to see how any of these rules would be relevant.  Since moreover none of the four 
jurisdictions seems to be more “formalist” than others on this point, the solution adopted here is to classify 
all four jurisdictions as allowing free weighing of evidence, i.e., as “non-formalist.” 
E.  “Control of Superior Review” 
For intensity of appellate review, one might expect the Civil Law jurisdictions to be significantly stricter 
than the Common Law countries.
32  However, all four jurisdictions allow appeal in this case
33, and as the 
subindex components are defined, the strictest appellate review reigns in New York.  This is because New 
York is the only jurisdiction where an appeal automatically stays execution.
34  To be precise, this only 
applies if the defendant posts an undertaking not to commit waste and pay rent for the duration of the 
appeal, but the point is that this is entirely in the hands of the defendant – no judicial decision is necessary 
for the stay.  (France’s score for automatic stay would change if one assumed that the judge accepts the 
witness evidence and transforms the “référé” procedure into the standard “au fond” procedure.
35) 
As to the scope of appeal, “issues of both law and fact (evidence) can be reviewed by the appellate 
court” (emphasis added) in all four jurisdictions.
36  This includes England – the appellate court can review 
errors of fact as well as law.
37 
Finally, at least in principle all four jurisdictions allow interlocutory appeals – this should be a 
rarity in a simple eviction procedure, but they are not “always prohibited”, as required by the component 
definition. 
F.  “Engagement Formalities” 
With respect to the formalities involved in notifying the complaint and judgment, France stands out 
because it is the only one of the four jurisdictions to require that these documents be served by the sheriff 
                                                           
32 Civil Law judiciaries are generally more hierarchical than Common Law judiciaries; in particular, they 
use appeals on a more systematic basis (Damaška 1986). 
33 See CPR Rule 52 and 53 PD 2A.1 (which court to appeal to depends on the court that decided at first 
instance); Art. L. 321-2-1 (formerly R. 321-2) COJ, 34, 543, 490 para. 1 NCPC (appeal to the “Tribunal de 
Grande Instance” – appeal is open because the expulsion claim is of indeterminate amount, see above n. 10; 
appeal is open regardless of whether the “procédure au fond” or the “référé” is used); § 511 para. 1, para. 2 
no. 1 ZPO with § 72 GVG (appeal to the “Landgericht”); CCA § 1701 with 22 NYCRR 640.1 (appeal to 
the Appellate Term).  Appeal is as of right in France, Germany, and the US; see the French and German 
provisions cited and CCA § 1702(a)(1).  In England, appeal is open only with permission of the court, CPR 
52.3. 
Also, in England, s. 77(6) County Courts Act excludes appeal on any question of fact if, by virtue of the 
applicable statutory provision under which possession was granted, the Court can only grant possession on 
being satisfied that it is reasonable to do so.  s. 77(6) gives a list of such statutory provisions.  However, 
these referenced provisions do not include s. 7 Housing Act 1988, as it applies to the grounds in Part I of 
Schedule 2 to that Act (in particular ground 8: non-payment of rent). 
34 See CCA § 1703(a), CPLR 5516(a)(6) (this applies in tenant eviction proceedings, see, e.g., Wilber v. 
Abare 138 Misc.2d 754, at 762 (1988), and 3 Rasch’s Landlord and Tenant
4 § 47:8).  For the lack of 
automatic stay in the other jurisdictions, see Art. 489 para. 1, 514 para. 2, 524 para. 2 NCPC, § 708 no. 7 
ZPO, and CPR Rule 52.7.  In Germany, the losing respondent is granted the possibility to avert execution 
pending appeal by posting a bond (§ 711 ZPO), but, unlike in New York, the winning claimant can regain 
the right to execution by posting a bond himself (id.). 
35 See Art. 500-502, 504 NCPC and the discussion above in Part A.2. 
36 See CPR Rule 52.11(1)(b)/(4), Art. 561 NCPC, § 529 para. 1 ZPO, CPRL 5501(d). 
37 It may even choose to conduct a full rehearing, but this would be exceedingly rare in an eviction case.  
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(“huissier”).
38  In England and Germany, this is done by the court simply through the postal service.
39  In 
England, the party on whose behalf the document is served may also elect to arrange for service itself, as it 
would have to in New York.
40 
A conciliation attempt before filing the lawsuit is not required in any of the four jurisdictions.  It is 
interesting to note, however, that all of them give the judge special powers and/or missions to facilitate 
settlement.
41 
G.  “Independent Procedural Actions” 
This last subindex is the predecessor to the complexity measure (number of steps) provided by later World 
Bank Doing Business reports and used in the present paper.  It is omitted from the “formalism index” 
values provided below and in the paper to distinguish clearly between complexity and formalism.
42  The 
discussion in this Section is provided for the sake of completeness only.  It omits the last subindex 
component, the steps required for enforcement, because of considerable difficulties in counting those steps. 
For the most part, the definition of the index component in Djankov et al. (2003) corresponds to 
that used by the World Bank.  An “independent procedural action” is “a step of the procedure, mandated by 
law or court regulation, that demands interaction between the parties or between them and the judge or 
court officer” (emphasis added).  Examples given include not only “filing a motion, attending a hearing, 
mailing a letter, or seizing some good”, but also “every judicial or administrative writ or resolution”.  The 
one important difference between Djankov et al. (2003, 469) and the World Bank (2004, 42 and 109; and 
                                                           
38 See in France Art. 54, 55, 485 para. 1, 651 para. 2 NCPC for service of process, and Art. 675 para. 1, 651 
para. 2 NCPC for service of the judgment.  Art. 61 of Law 91-650 of 9 July 1991 also requires formal 
service through the sheriff of a demand to surrender the premises (“commandement d’avoir à libérer les 
locaux”) at least 2 months in advance of eviction; this can be combined with the service of judgment, Art. 
194 decree 92-755. 
39 See CPR Rule 55.13(3) and §§ 271 I, 498, 166 II, 176 to 182 ZPO (these provisions came into force on 1 
July 2002, but for the points relevant here the law was the same before).  When effecting the service, the 
postal service, a private law company, is qualified by German law as a “beliehener Unternehmer”, i.e., 
charged with specific public law duties and powers.  But since it does not change the postal service’s actual 
operation in delivering the process documents, this should not qualify the German postal service as a 
“judicial officer” for present purposes.  One might view the incontournable intervention of the judge in the 
process in Germany as “service” through a judicial officer, but given that the judge does not serve herself 
and the arrangement of forwarding the documents directly to the other party actually saves the interested 
party time, this view is not adopted here (nor was it in Djankov et al. 2003). 
40 See in England CPR Rule 6.4(1), and in New York CRPL 304, RPAPL 731, 735, CCA 400, 403.  Note 
that in any event the claim form (England) / notice of petition (New York) must be issued by the court 
before the claimant can commence service, cf. in England CPR Rule 7.2, and see in New York CCA 401(c) 
(which supersedes RPAPL 731(1)). 
41 See in England CPR Rules 26.4(2)(b)/(3) (court has power on its own initiative to order a stay of the 
proceedings to facilitate settlement); in France Art. 829 para. 1, 840, 841 NCPC (court will attempt 
settlement before proceeding to contentious hearing; query though whether these formally apply in the 
“référé” procedure”) and, since 2003, Art. 829 para. 3 NCPC; in Germany § 278 ZPO (as in France); in 
New York NYCRR 208.03(b) and the Civil Court Directive re: Housing Court Initiative of 24 December 
1997, as amended 5 October 2001, and available at 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/nyc/housing/directives/DRP/drp150.pdf#search=%22%20%22Resoluti
on%20Part%22%20site%3Acourts.state.ny.us%22 (case is sent to Resolution Part before being admitted, if 
no settlement is reached, to the Trial Part). 
42 As a practical matter, counting this subindex would be problematic because values need to be scaled 
relative to the sample minimum and maximum of the full 109-country sample, which, given the discussion 
of this section, might be quite different from those reported in Djankov et al. (2003) and, because of the 
different counting of contemporaneous actions, also from those reported in World Bank (2009).  
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subsequent reports), however, is that only in the former, the “[a]ctions are always assumed to be 
simultaneous if possible, so procedural events that may be fulfilled in the same day and place are only 
counted as one action.”  This is crucial because it means that everything that happens at a hearing – 
evidence-taking, arguments, judgment – counts as a single step.
43 
1.  Filing and Service 
For “filing and service” of process, the appropriate numbers appear to be 2, 4, 2-4, and 4 steps for England, 
France, Germany, and New York, respectively.
44 
2.  Trial and Judgment 
Since the trial can be held in one day in all jurisdictions and the judgment pronounced at the end of it, all 
four jurisdictions require only one step for the actual trial and judgment, at least if no witnesses are called 
(either because the parties do not suggest any or because the judge refuses their testimony as irrelevant).  
The number of additional steps required for opposition and/or notification of the trial date are (assuming as 
before that the parties and judges always make the “non-formalist” choice, and counting one party’s 
communication of a document to both the court and the other party as two steps):  2 in England (filing of 
defense and service on claimant)
45, 0 in France
46, 1 in Germany (notification of hearing date to plaintiff)
47, 
and 4 in New York (filing of answer and service on claimant, notification of hearing date to both parties).
48 
                                                           
43 Cf. the count of three steps for the “neighbor model” in Djankov et al. (2003,475):  “(1) a claimant would 
request the judge’s intervention, (2) the judge and the claimant would together meet the defendant and the 
judge would issue a decision following a discussion, and (3) the judgment would be enforced.” 
44 The respective sequences would be (counts in brackets): 
England:  claimant files the claim form and particulars of claim with the court (1), the court (or the 
claimant) serves the claim form and particulars on the respondent, usually by first class post (1) (cf. CPR 
Rule 6.2.(1)(b), 6.3, 7.2, 7.5(1), and in case of service by the claimant CPR Rule 55.8(6)).  This assumes 
that the claimant files the claim form in person so that she can obtain a hearing date in that same step. 
France:  claimant charges the sheriff (“huissier”) with service of the demand (“assignation”) and files a 
notice to that effect or a copy with the court (2), the sheriff serves on the respondent and returns the process 
document to the claimant (2 – the claimant also needs to file the process document with the court, but 
usually does so only at the hearing so it is not counted as a separate step here) (cf. Art. 53-55, 56 no. 1, 485, 
651 para. 2 NCPC, and Dalloz Action Proc. Civ. para. 1738 [on the necessity of delivering a copy of the 
process document, the practice of filing a notice or copy of the complaint with the court in advance of the 
hearing, and courts’ practice not to admit the complaint to the hearing unless this has been done]). 
Germany:  plaintiff pays the court fee and files the complaint (whether this is 1 or 2 steps depends on 
whether the purchase of the necessary fee stamps in the courthouse counts as a separate step), court serves 
the complaint on the defendant through the postal service (1 or, if the postal service’s return of the proof of 
service were to count as a step, 2) (cf. §§ 253 para. 5, 271 para. 1, 166 para. 2, 176 to 182 ZPO, 65 para. 1 
phrase 1 GKG). 
New York:  claimant files petition and buys an index number from the clerk (1), claimant serves on 
respondent (1), claimant files with the court notice of petition with notarized affidavit of service (1), court 
addresses postcard to respondent (1) (cf. RPAPL § 732(1), NYCRR 208.42(d)/(i)). 
45 Cf. for this and the following CPR Rules 15.2, 15.4, 32.2(1)(b), 32.4, 32.6, 55.7, 55.8(1)/(3)/(4). 
46 Cf. Art. 10, 144, 148, 158, 432 para. 1, 841 NCPC. 
47 Cf. for this and the following §§ 495, 497, 129 II, 270, 272, 273 I, II no. 4, III, IV 1, 274, 275 I and II, 
310 I and II ZPO. 
48 Cf. § 732(1)/(2) RPAPL.  The hearing could count as two steps because of its bifurcation into 
proceedings before the Resolution and Trial Parts, see above n. 41.  
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The number of actions would increase in all jurisdictions except New York if one counted instead 
parties’ and judges’ usual choices, and/or let the witnesses be called to testify.  While parties in New York 
proceedings must bring their witnesses to the first and only hearing, the other three jurisdictions would 
usually need to add another hearing if witnesses were to be called (1 additional step).
49  More realistically 
though, English parties would introduce their witness testimony by way of witness statements, which need 
to be filed and served in advance of the hearing and would add 0 to 4 additional steps, depending on 
whether they are filed with the statement of case and the defense, respectively, or separately before the 
hearing.  Witness statements might also be used in France (0 to 4 additional steps).  In Germany, 2 steps 
need to be added in the realistic scenario where the court requires the respondent to file and serve a written 
answer; in that case, the court might be inclined to invite the witnesses to the first hearing, which would 
add another 2 steps because the parties would need to be informed of this. 
In sum, “trial and judgment” would require from 3 to 7 steps in England, 1 to 6 in France, 2 to 6 in 
Germany, and 5 in New York.  If one counted as only one step communication with the same content by 
one of the two parties to the court and the other party, or by the court to both parties
50, the maximum 
numbers would be 4, 2, 4, and 3, respectively. 
3.  Enforcement 
(Omitted) 
III. OVERALL “FORMALISM INDEX” (NET OF “INDEPENDENT PROCEDURAL ACTIONS”) 
The overall “Formalism Index” (net of “Independent Procedural Actions”) is derived by adding the six 
subindices.  According to the analysis of this Appendix, the values for England, France, Germany, and the 
US (New York) are 2.33, 2.76, 1.83, and 2.42, respectively.
51 (By comparison, the corresponding numbers 
in Djankov et al. 2003 are 2.08, 3.54, 3.37, and 2.75.)  By these numbers, Germany appears to be the least 
“formalist”, far ahead of England, which in turn is only very slightly ahead of third-placed New York.  
While France is ranked lowest, the average rank of common and civil law systems is the same (2.5), and 
the average “Formalism Index” value for France and Germany is even lower than for England and the US. 
The point of these numbers is not to argue that Germany is truly the least formalist of the four 
jurisdictions, or France the least.  The “formalism index” is too coarse for such ranking exercises, even 
though it may be good enough for regression analyses.  Rather, the point to make here is that actual index 
values may differ from those gathered in the first generation data collection, and that the picture with 
respect to legal origin may change as a result.  
From a conceptual point of view, it is worth noting that France only does badly because it requires 
service of process and of the judgment by the “huissier” – without this requirement, France’s index value 
would be 2.14, well lower than England’s and New York’s.  Whatever one may think of the “huissier”’s 
mandatory intervention, it is hard to believe that it alone could be so important as to determine the relative 
worth of French civil procedure in a comparative perspective – or if it could, then the differences between 
these developed countries would be too small to be worth talking about.  Similarly, Germany would fall 
back to third place if its postal service, when serving process or judgments, were qualified as a “judicial 
                                                           
49 In France, this would require that the “référé” procedure be transformed into the standard “au fond” 
procedure. 
50 Whether this corresponds better to the variable definition depends on whether the place of written 
communication is where it is posted (two letters, one place = 1 step) or where it is received (two letters, two 
places = 2 steps). 
51 Counting judges’ and parties’ standard choices instead of black letter law, the corresponding numbers 
would have been 2.53, 2.96, 2.37, and 2.62, respectively (or 3.30 for France if one also assumed conversion 
of the “référé” procedure into the “au fond” procedure [which entails automatic suspension of enforcement 
pending appeal]).  Hence, as mentioned above, the ordinal results of this Appendix are unaffected by this 
coding choice.  
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officer”, as German doctrine would have it.
52  By contrast, changing the German law to the “formalist” rule 
on four key points such as whether evidence is received in writing, whether the weight of documentary 
evidence is defined by law, whether only the judge may ask questions to witnesses, and whether a written 
answer is required, would not have changed Germany’s rank. 
Another way to make the same point is to consider a different, and more straightforward, way of 
aggregating the individual components – simple unweighted summation of index components, instead of 
forming subindices resulting in different weights for individual index components.  The sums of index 
components are 10 ¼, 11, 8, and 11 for England, France, Germany, and the US (New York), respectively.
53  
So with the most basic type of aggregation, the US would be as “formalist” as France, and England would 
be hardly any better. 
                                                           
52 Cf. above n. 39. 
53 Counting judges’ and parties’ standard choices instead of black letter law, the corresponding numbers are 
11, 12, 11 ½ , and 12, respectively, i.e., almost indistinguishable from each other.  
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The table below reproduces the component definitions and values from Djankov et al. (2003) for 
the eviction of a residential tenant for failure to pay rent for Germany, France, England, and the US, and the 
values applied by the analysis of this Appendix.  The numerical values from Djankov et al. (2003) are 
shown in the upper row, and those from this Appendix in the lower row.  The numbers in bold represent 
subindex values, and the non-bold numbers below the individual components of that subindex.  The 
subindex “independent procedural actions” is omitted, because improved data on a similar index (number 
of procedural steps) is now provided by the World Bank (2009) and treated separately in the paper (see 
above Part II.G).  For references and explanations, see the discussion above. 
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1. PROFESSIONALS VS. LAYMEN:  The index measures whether the resolution 
of the case relies on the work of professional judges and attorneys, as opposed 










(i)  General jurisdiction court 
The variable measures whether a court of general or of limited jurisdiction 
would be chosen or assigned to hear the case under normal circumstances. We 
define a court of general jurisdiction as a state institution, recognized by the 
law as part of the regular court system, generally competent to hear and decide 
regular civil or criminal cases. A limited jurisdiction court would hear and 
decide only some types of civil cases. Specialized debt-collection or housing 
courts, small-claims courts, and arbitrators or justices of the peace are 











(ii)  Professional vs. non-professional judge 
The variable measures whether the judge, or the members of the court or 
tribunal, could be considered as professional. A professional judge is one who 
has undergone a complete professional training as required by law, and whose 
primary activity is to act as judge or member of a court. A non-professional 
judge is an arbitrator, administrative officer, practicing attorney, merchant, or 
any other layperson who may be authorized to hear and decide the case. Equals 










(iii)  Legal representation is mandatory 
The variable measures whether the law requires the intervention of a licensed 
attorney. The variable equals one when legal representation is mandatory, and 










2.  WRITTEN VS. ORAL:  The index measures the written or oral nature of the 
actions involved in the procedure, from the filing of the complaint until the 










(i)  Filing 
Equals one if the complaint is normally submitted in written form to the court, 










(ii)  Service of process 
Equals one if the defendant’s first official notice of the complaint is most likely 










(iii)  Opposition 
Equals one if under normal circumstances the defendant’s answer to the 
complaint should be submitted in writing, and zero if it may be presented 
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(iv)  Evidence 
Equals one if evidence is mostly submitted to the court in written form, in the 
form of attachments, affidavits, or otherwise, and zero if most of the evidence, 










(v)  Final arguments 
Equals one if final arguments on the case are normally submitted in writing, 










(vi)  Judgment 
Equals one if the judge issues the final decision in the case in written form, and 
zero if he issues it orally in an open court hearing attended by the parties. The 
defining factor is whether the judge normally decides the case at a hearing. If 
the judge simply reads out a previously made written decision, the variable 
equals one. Conversely, for an orally pronounced judgment that is later 










(vii)  Notification of judgment 
Equals one if normally the parties receive their first notice of the final decision 
in written form, by notice mailed to them, publication in a court board or 
gazette, or through any other written means. The variable equals zero if they 










(viii)  Enforcement of judgment 
Equals one if the enforcement procedure is mostly carried out through the 











3.  LEGAL JUSTIFICATION:  The index measures the level of legal justification 










(i)  Complaint must be legally justified 
The variable measures whether the complaint is required, by law or court 
regulation, to include references to the applicable laws, legal reasoning, or 
formalities that would normally require legal training. Equals one for a legally 
justified complaint, and zero when the complaint does not require legal 










(ii)  Judgment must be legally justified 
The variable measures whether the judgment must expressly state the legal 
justification (articles of the law or case-law) for the decision. Equals one for a 










(iii)  Judgment must be on law (not on equity) 
The variable measures whether the judgment may be motivated on general 
equity grounds, or if it must be founded on the law. Equals one when judgment 











4.  STATUTORY REGULATION OF EVIDENCE:  The index measures the level of 
statutory control or intervention of the administration, admissibility, evaluation 










(i)  Judge cannot introduce evidence 
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not been requested, offered, or introduced by the parties, and zero otherwise. 
 
(ii)  Judge cannot reject irrelevant evidence 
Equals one if, by law, the judge cannot refuse to collect or admit evidence 











(iii)  Out-of-court statements are inadmissible 
Equals one if statements of fact that were not directly known or perceived by 
the witness, but only heard from a third person, may not be admitted as 










(iv)  Mandatory pre-qualification of questions 
Equals one if, by law, the judge must pre-qualify the questions before they are 










(v)  Oral interrogation only by judge 
Equals one if parties and witnesses can only be orally interrogated by the 











(vi)  Only original documents and certified copies are admissible 
Equals one if only original documents and "authentic" or "certified" copies are 
admissible documentary evidence, and zero if simple or uncertified copies are 










(vii)  Authenticity and weight of evidence defined by law 
Equals one if the authenticity and probative value of documentary evidence is 
specifically defined by the law, and zero if all admissible documentary 










(viii)  Mandatory recording of evidence 
Equals 1 if, by law, there must be a written or magnetic record of all evidence 










5.  CONTROL OF SUPERIOR REVIEW:  The index measures the level of control 










(i)  Enforcement of judgment is automatically suspended until 
resolution of the appeal 
Equals one if the enforcement of judgment is automatically suspended until 
resolution of the appeal when a request for appeal is granted. Equals zero if the 
suspension of the enforcement of judgment is not automatic, or if the judgment 










(ii)  Comprehensive review in appeal 
Equals one if issues of both law and fact (evidence) can be reviewed by the 
appellate court. Equals zero if only new evidence or issues of law can be 










(iii)  Interlocutory appeals are allowed 
Equals one if interlocutory appeals are allowed, and zero if they are always 
prohibited. Interlocutory appeals are defined as appeals against interlocutory or 
interim judicial decisions made during the course of a judicial proceeding in 
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6.  ENGAGEMENT FORMALITIES:  The index measures the formalities required 











(i)  Mandatory pre-trial conciliation 
Equals one if the law requires plaintiff to attempt a pre-trial conciliation or 










(ii)  Service of process by judicial officer required 
Equals one if the law requires the complaint to be served to the defendant 
through the intervention of a judicial officer, and zero if service of process may 










(iii)  Notification of judgment by judicial officer required 
Equals one if the law requires the judgment to be notified to the defendant 
through the intervention of a judicial officer, and zero if notification of 










7.  INDEPENDENT PROCEDURAL ACTIONS (not counted in overall index values 
below):  An independent procedural action is defined as a step of the 
procedure, mandated by law or court regulation, that demands interaction 
between the parties or between them and the judge or court officer (e.g., filing 
a motion, attending a hearing, mailing a letter, or seizing some goods). We 
also count as an independent procedural action every judicial or 
administrative writ or resolution (e.g., issuing judgment or entering a writ of 
execution) which is legally required to advance the proceedings until the 
enforcement of judgment. Actions are always assumed to be simultaneous if 
possible, so procedural events that may be fulfilled in the same day and place 
are only counted as one action. To form the index, we: (1) add the minimum 
number of independent procedural actions required to complete all the stages 
of the process (from filing of lawsuit to enforcement of judgment); and (2) 
normalize this number to fall between zero and one using the minimum and the 
maximum number of independent procedural actions among the countries in 
the sample. The index takes a value of zero for the country with the minimum 
number of independent procedural actions, and a value of one for the country 
with the maximum number of independent procedural actions. 
 
    
Filing and service 
The total minimum number of independent procedural actions required to 










Trial and judgment 
The total minimum number of independent procedural actions required to 
complete opposition to the complaint, hearing or trial, evidence, final 











The total minimum number of independent procedural actions required to 










FORMALISM INDEX (WITHOUT  INDEPENDENT  PROCEDURAL 
ACTIONS SUBINDEX) 
The index measures substantive and procedural statutory intervention in 
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preceding sub-]indices … 
 